Abstract
Bayesian Rationality in Games I
T seems worth recapitulating the basic foundation of subjectivistic decision theory, i.e., of rational choice under uncertainty, before developing the main contribution of this note.
This section presents typical assumptions about (i) the structure of the decision problem,
(ii) the consistency of the decision maker's preferences, and (iii) his behavior or, in the context of game theory, the behavior of the players. A nice overview of subjectivistic theories of rational choice can be found in Fishburn (1981) . Dyckerhoff (1994) presents alternative concepts of decision theory, which apply if the classical axioms of rational choice are violated. Readers being familiar with this topic must forgive me and may skip this section. Aumann and Dreze (2009) distinguish between "games against nature" and "strategic games."
This suggests that the principles of rational choice hold irrespective of whether we suppose that there is a single decision maker or a number of players competing with each other in a situation of conflict. Hence, we may always call the decision maker a "player." This work does not distinguish between cooperative and noncooperative games, since every noncooperative game that is properly specified may lead to cooperation if this is in the personal interest of each player (Selten, 2001 ).
Games against Nature
The following exposition is based on Fishburn (1981) . The state space of the decision problem is denoted by Ω. It is assumed that Ω is nonempty and each element ω ∈ Ω represents a "state of the world" or "state of nature." Consider a nonempty set F of subsets of Ω, such that Ω ∈ F , F ∈ F ⇒ Ω \ F ∈ F , and F 1 , F 2 , . . . ∈ F ⇒ i ∈N F i ∈ F . Hence, the set F is a σ-algebra and each element of F is said to be an event. We say that the event F ∈ F happens if and only if the state ω ∈ F obtains. The tuple (Ω, F ) represents a measurable space. A function p : F → [0, 1] is said to be a probability measure if and only if p(Ω) = 1 and p i ∈N F i = i ∈N p(F i ) for all mutually disjoint events F 1 , F 2 , . . . ∈ F . It is supposed that the decision maker has a subjective probability measure p, i.e., a prior, so that p(F ) represents his prior probability of F ∈ F . This leads to a subjective probability space (Ω, F , p) . Moreover, there exists a nonempty set N of null events, which consists of all F ∈ F with p(F ) = 0. The decision maker does not believe that any event F ∈ N happens and thus he ignores every null event. Hence, each F ∈ N is called insignificant, whereas every F ∈ F \ N is said to be significant. Fishburn (1981, p. 141) notes that, "states [. . . ] lead to specific consequences that depend on the course of action adopted by the individual." Moreover, he writes that, " [. . . ] the occurrence Frahm, 2015 • A Note on Correlated Equilibrium and Bayesian Rationality of one consequence precludes the occurrence of any other consequence." Thus, consider a nonempty set C , i.e., a set of consequences. In this work it is assumed that C is a subset of R n with n ∈ N. Let C Ω be the set of all F -measurable functions from Ω to C . Each s ∈ C Ω is referred to as a state variable. It can be understood as nature's "strategy," although it is not assumed that nature is a rational individual. Suppose that the decision maker chooses an action that leads to a state variable s. Then each state of nature, ω, leads to a specific consequence s(ω) ∈ C .
According to Aumann (1987, p. 6) , "The term 'state of the world' implies a definite specification of all parameters that may be the object of uncertainty [. . . ] ," and "Conditional on a given ω, everybody knows everything." This means s is uniquely determined by the decision maker's action. Indeed, the state variable, s, may change with each action, but once action and state of nature are fixed, the decision maker cannot be uncertain about s(ω). He does not know ω, but if somebody tells him ω, he certainly knows s(ω), i.e., the consequence that occurs if ω ∈ Ω obtains. Otherwise, Ω is not properly specified and we would have to cut each element of Ω into pieces, until every state of the world leads to a definite consequence.
Similar arguments hold for the set of possible actions. Since the actions are mutually exclusive, the action set of the decision maker is supposed to contain every available policy. For example, if
we consider a game against nature in its extensive form, where one decision may lead to another, we should take all sequential decision rules, that can be adopted by the player, into account.
Nonetheless, in the normal form of the game there is no time dimension and thus, at least in a formal sense, actions and consequences cannot be associated with any point in time. These observations go back to Savage (1954, Chapter 2.5 ).
The observation that s must be uniquely determined by the action of the decision maker might seem trivial prima facie, but the devil is in the details. The state variable s is an element of C Ω , i.e., the set of all F -measurable functions from Ω to C ⊆ R n . Moreover, the decision maker's prior, p, forms a quotient space of C Ω , i.e., a set of equivalence classes. This means two elements of C Ω belong to the same equivalence class, i.e., are considered identical by the decision maker, if and only if they are almost surely equal. Here, the notion of "almost surely" essentially depends on p. For example, consider two state variables s, t ∈ C Ω and suppose that there are two players with different priors. Then the state variables s and t could be identical from the perspective of Player 1. This means s and t differ only with respect to the null events, i.e., those events that are insignificant for Player 1. By contrast, for Player 2 the state variables s and t might be different, because they differ at least with respect to one event that is significant from his point of view.
Hence, the L 0 space of the decision maker essentially depends on his prior. Now, let S be a nonempty subset of C Ω . This can be seen as the set of state variables that are available to the decision maker. In a game against nature, it is not necessary to distinguish between the action of the decision maker and the associated state variable. Since every action leads to one and only one state variable, we can treat each element of S as an act. 1 In fact, Fishburn (1981, p. 143) calls each s ∈ S a Savage act. It is assumed that the decision maker has a measurable utility function u : R → R such that
for all s ∈ S . The Savage act s is preferred to t , i.e., s t , if and only if E u(s) > E u(t ) . Hence, the utility function u induces an asymmetric weak order on S , i.e., is a strict preference relation such that s t ⇒ ¬(t s) and r t ⇒ (r s ∨ s t ) for all r, s, t ∈ S . The decision maker is considered rational if and only if he chooses an optimal act s * ∈ S . This means there is no other Savage act s ∈ S such that E u(s) > E u(s * ) . This represents a behavioral assumption of rational choice, besides our given assumptions about structure and consistency.
So far we have assumed that the prior, p, and the utility function, u, are given. Hence, the preference relation has been obtained as a result of p and u. Subjectivistic decision theory usually goes the other way around (de Finetti, 1937 , Fishburn, 1981 , Ramsey, 1931 , Savage, 1954 .
This means one starts with some structural assumptions and basic requirements regarding the consistency of some given preference relation, and then shows that the given preferences can be represented by a subjective probability measure p and a utility function u (Fishburn, 1981) .
Hence, a rational decision maker acts as if he would maximize his subjective expected utility.
Actually, he need not know his prior or utility function, and thus it is not required that he is able, de facto, to compute his expected utility. In my humble opinion, the subjectivistic approach to rational choice does not try to explain how a rational decision maker comes to his conclusion, but it claims that his choice, for whatever reason, is rational (in the specific sense of the theory).
These arguments are mentioned only because they seem to be helpful in understanding the particular approach to strategic games chosen by Aumann (1987) .
In the Bayesian framework, the decision maker is equipped with a measurable partition I
of Ω, i.e., a set of nonempty and mutually disjoint events whose union equals Ω. We suppose that I is finite. This is done only for the sake of simplicity, but without loss of generality. Each element I ∈ I can be viewed as some private information of the decision maker. This means whenever ω ∈ Ω obtains, he knows whether ω ∈ I or ω ∈ Ω \ I , i.e., whether I happens or not. We call the information I negligible if I ∈ N and otherwise it is said to be substantial.
If the decision maker receives a substantial information I ∈ I , every event F ⊆ Ω \ I that is a priori significant, becomes a posteriori insignificant. More precisely, the decision maker substitutes the prior, p, by the posterior p(
and thus we have that p(F | I ) = 0 for all F, I ∈ F \ N with F ∩ I = . From the decision maker's point of view, the substantial information I leads to a new probability space, where the posterior p(·|I ) represents the subjective probability measure. In particular, the posterior forms a new L 0 space, i.e., two state variables s, t ∈ S are considered identical if and only if they coincide up to the events that are a posteriori insignificant.
Whenever the decision maker receives some information I ∈ I , he chooses a state variable s I must not depend on a choice that is made on the basis of another substantial information,
i.e., J ∈ I with J = I . This basic assumption will be referred to as the "Bayes postulate." Table 1 contains a game against nature, where the Bayes postulate is violated. The described procedure leads to a Savage act s ∈ S such that s(ω) = s I (ω) for all I ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω. We assume that each Savage act can be obtained in such a way, i.e., each element of S can be constructed by choosing an appropriate state variable s I for each substantial information I ∈ I .
The choice of the decision maker is indicated by an action a ∈ A. The action set A is supposed to be nonempty and nonsingular. Throughout this work, it is assumed that A is a subset of R. By acting on the basis of his private information partition I , i.e., choosing a control variable a ∈ A on I ∈ I , the decision maker creates a σ(I )-measurable function from Ω to A, where σ(I ) denotes the σ-algebra generated by I . This means the strategy of the player against nature is constant over each element of I .
This theoretical approach requires us to split the whole procedure of rational choice notionally into three different steps:
1. The decision maker receives some information I ∈ I .
He chooses an action a ∈ A.
3. His action leads to a state variable s I ∈ C Ω .
Actually, this decomposition goes beyond the scope of measure theory. In probabilistic terms, 
We conclude that every Bayes-rational decision maker is rational. Conversely, each rational decision maker is Bayes rational. Otherwise, there would exist a substantial information I ∈ I , where his action is suboptimal and so he could increase his unconditional expected utility by substituting the suboptimal action by an optimal one. Hence, Bayes rationality and rationality, in the unconditional sense, are just two sides of the same coin, provided we are able to decompose the procedure of rational choice into the different steps described above.
Strategic Games
The following model of strategic conflict is introduced by Aumann (1987) . Consider a strategic game in normal form with n ∈ N \ 1 players and let (Ω, F ) be the measurable space. 5 Each player is equipped with a prior p i , a utility function u i , a nonempty and nonsingular action set A i ⊆ R, and a private information partition I i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). The enumeration "i = 1, 2, . . . , n"
will be omitted whenever it seems clear from the context that the corresponding statement applies to each player. It is assumed that the join 
Savage act, so that u i (s(ω)) represents his utility, given that he applies the strategy s i , the others apply the strategies given by s i , and state ω ∈ Ω obtains.
According to Aumann and Dreze (2009) , strategic uncertainty can be treated like uncertainty in a game against nature. This means the players do not know the state of the world, ω, but if ω would be revealed to them, they would certainly know the actions of each other. More precisely, whenever Player i receives some substantial information I i ∈ I i , we can say that he "knows" s i up to the p i (· | I i )-null events. In our subjectivistic framework, it is not assumed that the players de facto know the strategies of each other (Aumann, 1987, S. 2). We do not aim at explaining how the players come to a rational conclusion and thus common knowledge is also superfluous. According to Aumann (1987, p. 10) , the assumption of common knowledge only "aid us in understanding the model, they do not affect the conclusions." As I understand the whole approach, it is just an ideal of strategic reasoning under uncertainty.
Throughout this work, it is supposed that the typical assumptions about structure of the game and consistency of preferences, that have been discussed in this section, are satisfied. This implies that the state space, Ω, is properly specified and thus we can treat strategic uncertainty like uncertainty in a game against nature. Aumann (1987, p. 2) points out that, "According to the Bayesian view, subjective probabilities should be assignable to every prospect, including that of players choosing certain strategies in certain games.
Rather than playing an equilibrium, the players should simply choose strategies that maximize their utilities given their subjective distributions over the other players' strategy choices."
Thus, we may assume that the players are Bayes rational. More precisely, after receiving a ," but this is omitted for notational convenience. 7 I would like to thank very much Andrés Perea for clarifying this point in a personal communication. 8 This means a i represents not only an action, but also a consequence of the decision of Player i on the basis of I i . 
Assumption B reflects the Bayes postulate and Assumption C leads to strategic independence. It can easily be verified that A ⇔ B ∧ C. 
for all a i ∈ A i . The same arguments hold for each other player. This means the resulting solution of the game, s * = (s * 1 , s * 2 , . . . , s * n ), must be such that
The tuple s * is said to be a subjective correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987, p. 14) . This reflects an ex-post situation of the game.
Moreover, Aumann (1987, p. 7) presumes that p i (F ) = p j (F ) for all F ∈ F and i , j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This means the players have a common prior, i.e., they act on a common probability space Ω, F , p . This fundamental assumption goes back to Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( -1968 . Under the commonprior assumption, the posteriors of the players can differ only through their private information, i.e., individual knowledge. Otherwise, the deviations could also be due to their individual beliefs, which are expressed by p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n . The common-prior assumption plays an important role in game theory. Aumann (1987, p. 12) points out that, "Common priors are explicit or implicit in the vast majority of the differential information literature in economics and game theory."
Nonetheless, it is subject of controversial discussion (Aumann, 1998 , Gul, 1998 , Morris, 1995 .
Common priors are indispensable if we want to guarantee that probabilistic statements are independent of individual beliefs. Otherwise, statements like "Strategy s 1 is stochastically independent of Strategy s 2 " and "Player 1 chooses Action a 1 with probability 1 2 " can no longer be made without specifying the underlying probability measure, i.e., the prior, of the corresponding 9 Aumann (1987, p. 4) player. Hence, if the priors are distinct, it is impossible to characterize the solution of the game by a single probability distribution of strategies. Nonetheless, Aumann (1987, Section 5) mentions that the common-prior assumption "is not a tautological consequence of the Bayesian approach" and discusses the question of why it is so pervasive in the game-theoretic literature. For a broad overview of the common-prior assumption in economics see Morris (1995) .
Indeed, if we follow the subjectivistic theory of rational choice, there is no reason to presume that the individuals have the same beliefs. Savage (1954, p. 3) points out that the personalistic interpretation of probability does "not deny the possibility that two reasonable individuals faced with the same evidence may have different degrees of confidence in the truth of the same proposition." Morris (1995) goes even further and argues that it makes little sense to assume that each player has a subjective probability and then to impose the common-prior assumption.
In the following, E(·) denotes the expectation of each player, based on the common prior. In this case, the solution s * is such that
This is said to be a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987, p. 4) . Correlated equilibrium does not require mutual independence of the strategies and so this equilibrium concept is quite general.
For example, Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951 ) is a correlated equilibrium, where the components of s * are mutually independent. Each convex combination of Nash equilibria is a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987, p. 4) . Another example is Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1967 (Harsanyi, -1968 , where the strategies are conditionally independent given the type of each player.
Collective vs. Individual Rationality
The main contribution of this note is based on the observation that the transition from "E i (·)" to "E(·)," i.e., from individual to common priors, has a substantial impact on the strategic reasoning of the players. Angels & Demons (see Table 1 ) describes a situation, where the decision maker is not able to choose a state variable, s I , on the basis of his private information I , without specifying the choice that he would have made on the basis of another information, and so the Bayes postulate is violated. This section reveals that, under the common-prior assumption, the situation in a strategic game is similar to that of Angels & Demons.
More precisely, it is shown that in every strategic game with imperfect information, the Bayes postulate cannot be satisfied at least for one player. Hence, Bayesian rationality cannot be used as a solution concept. Moreover, in a strategic game with perfect information, the assumption of strategic independence is always violated. This situation is similar to the rendezvous (see Table 2 ). Further, if some player changes his strategy, ex ante, each other player must change his strategy, too. This means, if the common-prior assumption is satisfied, the players choose their strategies in a coherent manner. This holds irrespective of whether they are rational or not, but if all players are rational, we always obtain a solution that is Pareto efficient and essentially unique.
Hence, the common-prior assumption leads to collective rationality. Conversely, individual rationality can be accomplished only if we refrain from the common-prior assumption. 
Collective Rationality

A Simple Illustration
A strategic game is a subtle object. To avoid unnecessary complications, we may consider a normal-form game with only two players. The state space of the game is depicted in Figure 1 .
The event set F is the σ-algebra generated by the partition I 1 ∩ I 2 , I 1 ∩ J 2 , I 2 ∩ I 1 , I 2 ∩ J 2 and the information partitions of the players are given by I 1 = I 1 , J 1 and I 2 = I 2 , J 2 , respectively.
It is assumed that the players have a common prior, where each nonempty event is significant.
Further, the action sets correspond to A 1 = A 2 = R.
Suppose that ω ∈ I 1 ∩ I 2 ⊂ Ω obtains. This means Player 1 knows that I 1 happens, whereas Player 2 knows that I 2 happens. Assume that Player 1 decides to choose the action "3." His action implies a certain strategy of Player 2. The point is that, due to Assumption B, the action of Player 1 uniquely determines the strategy of Player 2, up to the events that Player 1 considers a posteriori insignificant. For example, if Player 1 chooses "3," Player 2 might choose "2" in case ω ∈ I 2 and "1" if ω ∈ J 2 obtains. Since ω ∈ I 2 obtains, Player 2 decides to choose "2." This follows from our previous statement, namely that Player 2 chooses "2" in case ω ∈ I 2 and "1" if ω ∈ J 2 obtains, given that Player 1 chooses "3" in case ω ∈ I 1 . In the same way, the choice of Player 2 must lead to a definite strategy of Player 1. We already know that Player 1 chooses "3" in case ω ∈ I 1 and additionally we could say that he chooses "4" if ω ∈ J 1 obtains.
The players are Bayes rational and thus Action "3" is an optimal choice for Player 1, given his private information I 1 . This means there is no other action a 1 ∈ R, whose expected utility (conditional on I 1 ) is greater than the expected utility of Action "3." By comparing Action "3"
with some other possible action a 1 ∈ R, Player 1 may assume that Player 2 does not change his strategy. More precisely, Assumption C guarantees that Player 2 still chooses "2" in case ω ∈ I 2 and "1" if ω ∈ J 2 obtains, provided Player 1 chooses something else than "3" in case ω ∈ I 1 .
The problem is that Player 1 cannot choose any other action if Player 2 sticks with his choice.
In fact, we have already specified that Player 1 chooses Action "3" if ω ∈ I 1 obtains, given that Player 2 chooses Action "2" in case ω ∈ I 2 . If ω ∈ I 1 ∩ I 2 obtains, it cannot happen that Player 1 chooses "3" and any other action, simultaneously. Hence, Player 1 is not able to move from "3" to anything else, provided Player 2 adheres to Action "2." Put another way, if Player 1 moves from "3" to something else, then Player 2 must change his action as well and thus Assumption C is violated. The same arguments apply mutatis mutandis to Player 2.
The above arguments work only because both players consider I 1 ∩ I 2 significant. If I 1 were significant only for Player 1, the conflict would disappear instantaneously. In this case, Player 2 would simply be ignorant of whatever Player 1 does if ω ∈ I 1 obtains, and then Player 1 indeed could change his action uni-laterally. Similarly, if I 2 were significant only for Player 2, also he were able to deviate from his action uni-laterally. Nonetheless, due to the common-prior assumption, the conflict between Assumption B and Assumption C cannot be resolved.
These conclusions could be elusive for some readers. I would like to illustrate the simple logic behind my arguments in Figure 2 . Assumption B guarantees that each player has a response function. The red line in the first diagram indicates the response function of Player 1, i.e., the response of Player 2 to each possible action of Player 1. It implies that Player 2 will not change his action, "2," if Player 1 moves from "3" to "4." By contrast, the response function of Player 2 is given by the black line, which says that Player 1 will not change his action, "3," if Player 2 moves from "2" to anything else. Hence, the given response functions reflect Assumption C. In this case, Player 1 cannot move to "4." This can be seen as follows: If Player 1 moves to "4," Player 2 chooses "2," but then -according to the response function of Player 2 -Player 1 must choose "3."
This is a contradiction. The same arguments apply to Player 2, i.e., he cannot move to anything else. In fact, the only possible combination of actions is (3, 2), i.e., the point of intersection. The problem with this conclusion is twofold: (i) It has been assumed that each player can choose everything from R and (ii) it makes no sense to restrict the players to one and only one action.
Otherwise, the notion of Bayesian rationality becomes void.
We could try to resolve this problem by assuming that the black line, i.e., the response function of Player 2, depends on the action of Player 1. More precisely, as is shown in the second diagram, if Player 1 moves from "3" to "4," also the black line moves from "3" to "4." We can transfer this principle to Player 2, i.e., if Player 2 moves from "2" to "1," the same happens with the red line (see the third diagram). If we allow for this possibility, each arbitrary combination of actions within the product space A 1 × A 2 = R 2 is possible. Nonetheless, in this case, the action of Player 2 is not a function of the action of Player 1 and vice versa. This means Assumption B is violated and so the given response "functions" are meaningless.
To my mind, a meaningful solution of the problem is depicted in the fourth diagram. The green line represents the response functions of both players. As mentioned above, a player can choose only an action that belongs to an intersection point, and thus we can ignore those parts of the graphs that are either vertical (Player 1) or horizontal (Player 2). Hence, if we assume that both players are free to choose everything from R, the response functions must be congruent and thus bijective in R 2 . In this case, each player can do whatever he wants to do, but the choice of one player depends on the choice of the other. This means their actions are interconnected.
I hope that these explanations are not too awkward and enable the reader to see that the basic argument does not depend on the complexity of the state space, the event set, the action sets, or the number of players. The following section generalizes the aforementioned insights and elaborates the main contribution of this note in a more formal way.
Formal Statements
Throughout this section, it is supposed only that the priors p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n are equivalent on the measurable space (Ω, F ), i.e., p i (F ) = 0 if and only if p j (F ) = 0 for all F ∈ F and i , j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
This means the players agree about the significant events. This assumption is satisfied whenever the players have a common prior. 10 We do not require any behavioral assumption. In particular, it is not assumed that the players are (Bayes) rational.
The following theorem is a formal statement of our insights already discussed in Section 2.1.1.
Theorem 1. B precludes C.
Proof: Since the priors are equivalent, the players share the same set N of null events. Consider a player i and let I i ∈ F \ N be some substantial information. Then for every other player j = i we can find an information I j such that I i ∩ I j ∈ F \ N , which implies that I j ∈ F \ N . Player i can choose an arbitrary action a i ∈ A i on the basis of I i . Due to Assumption B, the strategy of Player j is uniquely determined by a i up to the null events according to I i . The next theorem states that the Bayes postulate is violated per se in every game with imperfect information. Formally, Player i is said to have imperfect information if and only if there exists a substantial information I i ∈ I i such that 0 < p i (I j | I i ) < 1 for some I j ∈ I j and j = i .
10 All the more, the equivalent-prior assumption is satisfied if we assume that the players have an objective prior. Theorem 2 renders Bayesian rationality in games with imperfect information useless. The problem is that Player i cannot predict the actions that are planned by Player j by taking only his action into consideration. His action represents a (very small) part of his overall strategy, but the potential actions of Player j , i.e., his strategy, depends on the overall strategy, but not on a single action, of Player i . This situation reminds a bit of Angels & Demons (see Table 1 ). In games with perfect information, we can apply Theorem 1. This means if the players know the response of each other, no player can change his action uni-laterally. In this case, every (Bayes-)rational player has to take the response of each other into account when maximizing his (conditional) expected utility. This will be illustrated in Section 3.
Although Theorem 2 implies that Bayesian rationality cannot be used as a solution concept for strategic games with imperfect information and equivalent priors, we must not conclude that our whole theory of rational choice is void. Our subjectivistic approach requires only that the strategy of Player i , s i , uniquely determines the tuple s i . In fact, this assumption is much weaker than the Bayes postulate expressed by B. . The set of state variables
is called the graph of f i . Similarly, the graph of f i j , i.e., G i j , is the set of all tuples s i , f i j (s i ) .
Since the priors are equivalent, the players share the same L 0 space, i.e., a player considers two strategies identical if and only if each other player considers the same strategies identical. We conclude that S := G 1 = G 2 = . . . = G n . More precisely, S is the set of all state variables that are available, ex ante, to each player. This means every element s ∈ S represents a Savage act. Further, the element s ∈ S that is actually realized is said to be the solution of the game.
Strategy tuples outside S cannot be realized, but the solution of the game cannot be determined, ex ante, without making further behavioral assumptions.
Theorem 3. For all s, t ∈ S with s = t we have that s i = t i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof: From Proposition 1 it follows that f i j is bijective for i , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, which leads to the statement of the theorem. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 can be interpreted as a "coherence principle." If a player changes his strategy, ex ante, each other player must change his strategy, too. Hence, the strategic-independence assumption cannot be satisfied if the priors are equivalent. In contrast to Theorem 1, Theorem 3
does not require Assumption B. The coherence principle is quite strong. It does not only say that the strategic-independence assumption can be violated, but that it is always violated. For this reason, we shall develop an appropriate notion of strategic rationality in games, where the equivalent-prior assumption is satisfied.
The following statements hold both for games against nature, i.e., n = 1, as well as for strategic games, i.e., n ∈ N \ 1 .
Definition 1 (Rational solution). A solution s * ∈ S is said to be rational if and only if
for all s ∈ S and i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Hence, a rational solution is a Savage act that is optimal for all players. The set of rational solutions is denoted by S * . Each rational solution is Pareto efficient. A rational solution need not be a correlated equilibrium.
Generally, we are not able explain the way how the solution of a strategic game takes place.
Nonetheless, if we assume that the players are rational, we can find the possible solution sets.
The core idea can be illustrated this way: Suppose that we want to maximize some arbitrary function φ : R 2 → R over its first argument. We could search for some point x ∈ R such that φ(x, y) is maximal given that y ∈ R is fixed, but this approach fails if y is an implicit function of x, i.e., y = f (x). In this case maximizing φ requires us to maximize φ x, f (x) over x. Here the two arguments x and y can be interpreted as strategies in a 2-person normal-form game.
The function φ represents the expected utility of Player 1 and f gives us the response of Player 2 to the strategy of Player 1, i.e., f is the response function of Player 1. Let ψ be the expected utility of Player 2 and g his response function. Due to Proposition 1 we have that g = f −1 . This means Player 2 has to maximize ψ f −1 (y), y over y, whereas Player 1 maximizes φ x, f (x) over
x. The solution set is given by S = (x, y): y = f (x) . A rational solution is a point (x * , y * ) ∈ R 2 that maximizes the expected utilities of both players, i.e.,
for all x, y ∈ R. Hence, if the players are rational, only those response functions can be possible that lead to a nonempty set of rational solutions. This might substantially restrict the set of candidates for the response function f , and thus the set of Savage acts. This technique will be demonstrated in Section 3.
Definition 2 (Uniqueness). The elements of a set R ⊆ S are said to be essentially unique if and only if E u i (s) = E u i (t ) for all s, t ∈ R and i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
The rational solutions of a game are essentially unique. This can be seen as follows: Suppose that there exist two rational solutions s, t ∈ S * with E u i (s) = E u i (t ) . Then either E u i (s) < E u i (t ) or E u i (s) > E u i (t ) and thus Player i can improve his expected utility by moving from s to t or from t to s. Hence, either s or t cannot be a rational solution.
Hence, under the equivalent-prior assumption, the rational solution of a game is always Pareto efficient and essentially unique. This reflects collective rationality. In the next section, we investigate games, where the players are not collectively rational.
Individual Rationality
Collective rationality arises if the players are rational and agree about the significant events. In this case, all actions that are planned by the players are visible for each other. More precisely, by choosing a specific strategy, Player i forms the predictions of Player j = i . This is because each other player considers the elements of the private information partition of Player i significant, too. If any information I i ∈ I i were insignificant for the other players, they would be ignorant of whatever Player i does on the basis of I i . However, this is impossible if the priors are equivalent.
In many practical situations of strategic conflict, no player is able to verify the plan of each other. This means each player is completely ignorant of whatever his opponents are going to do.
In this case, the priors cannot be equivalent. More precisely, they must even be disjoint, in the sense that each private information that is considered significant by one player is considered insignificant by every other player. Formally, p i (I i ) > 0 ⇒ p j (I i ) = 0 for all I i ∈ I i and i , j = 1, 2, . . . , n with i = j . We could also imagine hybrid forms, where the players agree about the significance of some events, but disagree about the significance of other events.
Hence, we may suppose that the priors p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n are not equivalent on the measurable space (Ω, F ). 12 We do not only assume that the players possess individual priors, i.e., that the common-prior assumption is violated. Rather, it is assumed that each player has his own L 0 space. This means there always exist two strategies that are considered identical by Player i , but appear different to Player j = i . Moreover, if the priors are disjoint, we must no longer "fear" that the strategy of one player has an impact on the strategy of another. This means under these circumstances we can readily justify the assumption of strategic independence. Nonetheless, we are always able to find priors that allow both for strategic dependence and independence at the same time. It all depends on the question of whether there exists an intersection I i ∩ I j ∈ F such that p i (I i ∩ I j ) > 0 and p j (I i ∩ I j ) > 0 for any I i ∈ I i and I j ∈ I j with i = j .
13
In any way, each rational player aims at maximizing his subjective expected utility. Hence, nonequivalent priors reflect individual rationality in a strategic game. Moreover, if the priors 12 Once again, we need not assume that the players are (Bayes) rational. 13 If the priors are disjoint, this situation can never happen. 
Example
The contribution of this note can be easily clarified with the aid of an example. This is done, without any loss of generality, by the prisoner's dilemma (see Table 3 ). Suppose that the action of Player 1 is not visible for Player 2 and vice versa. To make things as easy as possible, we may assume that Ω = 1, 2 , F = , 1 , 2 , Ω , and I 1 = I 2 = 1 , 2 . Further, we assume that p 1 1 = p 2 2 = 1 and so the priors are disjoint. The players possess the action sets A 1 = A 2 = 0, 1 , where 0 means "deny" and 1 stands for "confess." Indeed, this structure is very simple. We could also have chosen a more complicated model, that allows for imperfect information, but this would not have any substantial impact on our conclusions. The profound connoisseur of the matter may excuse the simplicity of the model, but it is sufficient to explain the essential difference between collective and individual rationality without unnecessary complications.
Player 1 acts on the basis of information 1 and ignores 2 , whereas Player 2 acts on the basis of information 2 and ignores 1 . This means both players ignore the action of each other. Communication would not solve the basic problem, namely that the players have no possibility to verify the plan of each other, irrespective of whatever one makes the other believe.
Since the priors are disjoint, nobody is able to react to each other. Thus, we may accept the assumption of strategic independence. In this case, it is always best for Player 1 to confess. Since Player 2 cannot foresee what Player 1 will testify in court, Player 1 can defect without influencing the action of Player 2. The same arguments apply to Player 2. Hence, both players must confess if they are rational. This is the well-known noncooperative solution of the prisoner's dilemma. Now, suppose that the prisoners are sitting together with their lawyer, who is instructed to announce their testimonies in court. He asks the prisoners to make their choices. In this case, each player can verify the plan of the other, which has a substantial impact on the structure of the game. More precisely, the players act on a common probability space Ω, F , p with Ω = 0 and F = , Ω , where the private information partitions are I 1 = I 2 = Ω . Hence, the players do not ignore the actions of each other. This is in direct contrast to the situation described before, where each player is completely ignorant of the other's action. Due to the simple structure of the game, each player knows the response of his opponent. This can be explained in a more formal way as follows: The players know everything that is determined by Ω. This means they know the action of each other. The action of Player 2 is uniquely determined by the action of Player 1 and vice versa. For example, we could assume that Player 2 chooses Action 1 ("confess") if Player 1 chooses Action 0 ("deny"). According to Theorem 3, there must be a one-to-one correspondence between their actions. This means Player 1 must choose Action 0 if Player 2 chooses Action 1.
Thus, we have assumed that a 1 = 0 ⇔ a 2 = 1, which implies that a 1 = 1 ⇔ a 2 = 0. If Player 1 is rational, he will choose a 1 = 1 ⇒ a 2 = 0, but then Player 2 cannot be rational, since otherwise he would choose a 2 = 1 ⇒ a 1 = 0. Hence, the given response functions do not lead to a rational solution, i.e., we have that S * = . By contrast, we could assume that a 1 = 0 ⇔ a 2 = 0 and thus a 1 = 1 ⇔ a 2 = 1. This is called tit for tat, which is thoroughly investigated in literature (see, e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981) . Now, we obtain a rational solution, i.e., both players deny. Hence, collective rationality leads to cooperation. In fact, this rational solution is not an equilibrium.
Nonetheless, no rational player has an incentive to defect, since he knows that the other player will then defect, too.
Conclusion
The subjectivistic theory of rational choice is based on structural assumptions, which imply that strategic uncertainty can be treated like uncertainty in a game against nature. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that the players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and choose their strategies independently. We have seen that, under the common-prior assumption, the Bayes postulate is violated, unless the players have perfect information. This makes Bayesian rationality useless as a solution concept for strategic games under uncertainty.
The given results do not require a common prior. They hold if the priors are only equivalent.
It was shown that the strategic-independence assumption is always violated. More precisely, the players choose their strategies coherently. This means if some player changes his strategy, each other player must change his strategy, too. This holds irrespective of whether the players are rational or not. If the players are rational, the coherence principle leads to a Pareto-efficient and essentially unique solution. Hence, equivalent priors lead to collective rationality.
Hence, individual rationality requires us to refrain from equivalent priors. In particular, the strategic-independence assumption can be satisfied only if the priors are disjoint. Disjoint priors characterize strategic games, where no player is able to verify the plan of each other. However, individual rationality does not require strategic independence. This means there exist games, where the strategic-independence assumption is violated although the priors are disjoint.
